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Non-Technical Summary
Investment behavior is influenced by corporate taxation. High taxes hinder investment, whereas low tax rates favor it, especially within a context of cross-border direct investment. This claim is backed by a broad array of highly credible scientific literature. Nevertheless, in the public debate of tax practitioners, it can by no means be considered part of the common consensus. Whilst focusing on other determinants of direct investment sometimes any relevance of the taxation factor is denied. This paper has two overall goals: first, to empirically work out the effect of taxes on investment behavior and second, to document which requirements need to be fulfilled to arrive at a sound conclusion.
The applied Microdatabase Direct Investment (MiDi) by the German Federal Bank covers the direct investment development of German parent companies abroad and that of foreign parent companies in Germany. The paper is structured in a mirror image style covering both of these investment directions.
The timeline in question consists of 13 years and ranges from 1996 to 2008. The paper considers firm heterogeneity regarding their respective profit and loss histories and additionally analyzes the tax incentive to establish holding companies. As a robustness check, findings on Germany as a whole are supplemented by a subsample of the strongly export orientated federal state Baden-Württemberg.
The descriptive analysis shows the rapid growth of both inbound and outbound international investment activity in the observed period from 1996 to 2008. The development of BadenWürttemberg corporations has largely been the same as that of Germany as a whole. Since estimations require a minimum amount of variation and different comparison groups, proving the tax rate effect on investment here is only possible in the outbound case, but not in the inbound case.
From the outbound case, I conclude that a by 10 percentage points increased corporate tax rate causes a 5.32% reduction in investment, measured by fixed assets. Accordingly, a by 10 percentage points lower corporate tax rate leads to about 5% higher investments. In a second step, I find empirical evidence that companies with an existing loss carryforward are less concerned with tax rates in their investment decisions. About half of the negative tax rate effect is compensated for firms with an existing loss carryforward. For firms with loss carryforwards, a tax rate increase of ten percentage points therefore only leads to a reduction in investment by 2.54%.
The third step extends the empirical analysis into the research field concerned with corporations' structures. Especially holding companies are set up by multinational corporations in tax favorable destinations in order for investments to be able to be structured optimally regarding tax. A decrease of ten percentage points in a country's corporate tax rate causes an increase in the share of holding companies in all subsidiaries in that location by 0.55%. The effect is even stronger regarding withholding taxes. A ten percentage point decrease in withholding taxes causes an increase of 0.80% in holding companies relative to all kinds of subsidiaries. 
Das Wichtigste in Kürze

Introduction
Investment behavior is influenced by corporate taxation. High taxes hinder investment, whereas low tax rates favor it, especially within a context of cross-border direct investment. This claim is backed by a broad array of highly credible scientific literature. 1 Nevertheless, in the public debate of tax practitioners, it can by no means be considered part of the common consensus. Time and time again other determinants of direct investment are highlighted. The latter may stem from a desire for market development, whereby any relevance of the taxation factor is denied. Should a car manufacturer identify China as an emerging market, the medium-sized company supplying it has no other option but to invest there. It has to do so regardless of China's taxation policy. The great strength of the econometric discipline lies in its capacity to incorporate different effects such as the suspected 'China Effect' in its mathematical models.
Within such a framework this paper seeks to identify the econometric and micro economical approaches best suited for verifying the effect of taxation on direct investment behavior. Such is without neglecting any other influencing factors and recognizing areas that continue to exemplify problematic results. An analysis of German inbound and outbound direct investment is added. Findings on Germany as a whole are observed in contrast with the data of the strongly export orientated federal state Baden-Württemberg.
This comparison indicates the overall validity of the findings. The paper considers firm's heterogeneity regarding their respective profit and loss histories and may therefore be considered part of the cutting edge of current research efforts. With its analysis of holding companies and associated corporate group structuring this paper enters into a field that requires further detailed research in coming years.
The foundational data shows the direct investment development of German parent companies abroad and that of foreign parent companies in Germany. Only limited liability companies are considered. The paper is structured in a mirror image style: The first part examines outbound investment and the second inbound investment. Both start off with a presentation of descriptive nature. The timeline for direct investment is shown for Germany as one and for the individual federal states. Special attention will be paid to the foreign investment of Baden-Württemberg firms and any investment of foreign firms within Baden-Württemberg. The timeline in question consists of 13 years and ranges from 1. So called meta studies summarize results of past investigations into the effect of tax on direct investment. Hereby they calculate the average 'to be expected effect '. See De Mooij und Ederveen (2003) and Feld und Heckemeyer (2011). 1996 to 2008. This paper makes a conscious effort not to formulate an economic analysis of the most recent economic crisis, but instead strives to highlight the overall trend of investment developments. The effect of taxation will be examined by means of a linear estimation method, which allows for the econometric function to be derived in a transparent way. The empirical section will firstly examine the effect of corporate taxes on investment. Then existing tax loss carryforwards and investment structure decisions will also be illuminated.
Influence of corporate taxation on investment behavior
Investment of German companies abroad
This paper's first analytical step will look at German parent corporations' investment abroad. The analysis is based on micro data. Unlike with aggregated macro-economic data, micro data analyses bears the advantage that recognized characteristics of corporations can be taken into account. Investment is primarily a flow value. When looking at individual corporations' investment abroad however, stock values will have to be used, since only these are observable on the balance sheets. The dynamic will at a later stage be developed by econometrical estimations using the difference in observed stock values between two successive years. The resulting descriptive evaluation shows the development of the stock value 'fixed assets' and hereby reveals the extent to which German parent corporations are invested abroad. Intangible assets are included only to the degree to which they are activated on the balance sheets. 2. It is worth pointing out that the described increase in German assets abroad from 1996 to 2008 may be subject to the influence of exchange rate effects. Towards the end of 1996, most investment targets of German investors' balance sheets were in foreign currency and had to be converted to D-Mark. As a result, some of the changes in investment may merely be due to fluctuating exchange rates rather than actual investment activity. The Bundesbank has converted D-Mark values into euro values for the years 1996 to 1998.
Investment development
Corporate Tax development
So far investments have only been looked at in terms of assets held by foreign subsidiaries.
Considering the fact that ultimately the effect of corporate tax rates on investment is to be determined, the development of corporate tax rates has to be shown. Chart 3 illustrates the development of corporate tax rates some of those countries with the highest average stock of assets invested by German parent corporations. The investment development is also graphed for purposes of comparison.
What can be seen in chart 3 is that whilst investment is on the rise, the average corporate tax rate of all countries falls. As a result, the used average corporate tax rate is reduced to that of the most relevant countries only, since a changing corporate tax rate in a country behavior, the increased investment in Russia may also be attributed to decreased tax rates.
Much like before, the one point of critique regarding the charts' credibility is the lack of attention directed towards other factors possibly influencing investment. In order to tackle this problem, econometric estimation methods need to be drawn upon.
Empirical investigating into the effect of tax rates on investment
The estimation's merit depends on the extent and precision with which all the factors influencing investment are included. Two approaches allow several of these influencing factors to be covered without having to collect any data. First of all, it seems very likely that a foreign subsidiary with a large amount of assets in one year will also have such a high level of assets in the following year. Therefore, instead of using the absolute level of assets, the first differences between investments serve as the dependent variable. In order to formulate a valid statement, all explanatory (= independent) variables have to be applied in first differences as well. Therefore, it is the tax rate difference between two years and not the tax rate itself that is included in the estimation.
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The second approach neutralizes business cycle fluctuations and other extraordinary temporal effects. This is accomplished with the help of so-called annual dummies. For every year a variable is created that is one for this exact year and zero for all others. The effect of unusually high investment in 1999 for example would be recorded by the annual dummy for 1999. Usage of annual dummies would only prove to be problematic if all tax rate cuts were to occur in a single year. As can be seen from the above charts, this is not the case.
Beyond these specification details, additional factors driving investment have to be thought of; for instance GDP, firm's profitability and inflation. Country dummies may not be used here, as annual dummies and country dummies together would cover up any tax rate effects. The remaining option is to check for characteristics of the individual countries.
This means including individual influence factors in the estimation procedure. As outlined above, these are applied in first differences.
GDP is supposed to be the most important control variable. The first difference detects GDP growth. It may represent a proxy for the size or development of the foreign target market. Controlled hereby is amongst others the talked about 'China-Effect'. GDP per capita is also taken into account, which provides an insight into the extent to which domestic consumers can actually afford the given produce. At the same time it serves as a proxy for labor costs. The individual firm's profitability of the currently considered period and the preceding period are also taken into account. One may assume a company that was profitable in the foregone period to invest more than an unprofitable company. As a standard controlling instance, the inflation rate is also included. The following contains three tables with regression results. They are thematically structured and build on one another in that the first investigates the overall effect of tax on investment and the two following it concentrate on more detailed and in depth questions.
The overall way to read these tables is identical and briefly summarized in the following.
The dependent variable is the volume of fixed assets (table 1 and 2) or a measure that indicates whether a subsidiary is a holding company or not (table 3) .
The tax rates used in the estimation are the statutory ones (nominal rates). ( (5) and (6) are based only on those subsidiaries, whose parent corporations are based in Baden-Württemberg. This explains the significantly smaller amount of observations included in the estimations of these two columns. Looking at the coefficient alone, columns (5) and (6) seem to indicate multinationals from Baden-Württemberg to be particularly tax sensitive. Columns (7) and (8) check, whether such is actually the case on a statistically relevant level. The estimations in columns (7) and (8) would mean that systematically more investment stems from Baden-Württemberg than is the case for the other federal states. The coefficient is insignificant, which renders any interpretation of its seize or sign redundant. The second new independent variable is the interaction term. It is the product of the BaWü-dummy and the tax rate and is also not significant. A statistically significant deviation of the tax rate sensitivity of Baden-Württemberg based parent corporations in particular may therefore not be identified. The numerically larger effect in columns (5) and (6) is thus predominantly a result of the changed assembly, and/or the reduced extent of the sample. Baden-Württemberg based international parent corporations do not systematically differ in the way they include the tax rate effect in their investment calculations to parent corporations from other federal states.
Regarding the control variables, it becomes clear that profitability and assets of the foregone period have a significant and positive effect on investment in the current period.
To be more precise, considerable increases in profitability and/or in assets of the prior period have a significant effect on the growth of assets in the current period because the estimation is in first differences. What is particularly interesting is the fact that profitability of the current period is insignificant, whilst that of the previous period is always highly significant. This seems intuitively sensible, since the money gained in the recent past may be used for new assets, whereas any gains from the current period have not yet been given the chance to be designated or decided upon. The temporal shift by one period can be explained by the fact that any signal indicating a certain subsidiary to be a lucrative investment opportunity will have to find its way to the parent corporation in Germany before any kind of investment can be authorized. For the effect of growing assets from the preceding period on current asset growth, the carried out aspects regarding profitability count as analogue.
A higher GDP per capita causes higher investment in some estimations. This can be explained by the following. An increasingly wealthy state becomes ever more attractive as a target market and thus receives more investment. Looking at the currency variable, the significant coefficient implies that one ought to check for this effect, too. As expected, the OECD country risk rating is negative. This is because countries with a high risk rating receive rather little investment. The effect is, however, rarely of significance. The frequent insignificance may be traced back to the lack of third world high level risk countries within the 51 countries that the estimations are based on.
Regression In regression table 1 the overall tax rate effect is investigated. Firms' heterogeneity has largely been considered, since micro-data of individual corporations and not investment numbers aggregated into country or annual level have been used for the estimations. When investigating the tax rate effect on investment, it would be rather helpful to be able to isolate corporations that are either very strongly or not at all affected by the tax rate. The latter kind could theoretically be foreign subsidiaries that are granted a period free of taxation, a so called 'tax holiday'. The identification of such subsidiaries is difficult, since such incentives are currently mostly handled on an individual base. Such exemption from taxation should also not be granted to too many subsidiaries. There is nonetheless another way through which corporations more or less affected by taxes can be identified. The tax rate is significantly less relevant for corporations with loss carryforwards. After all, they have the possibility to guard their profits from being taxed by using some or all losses carried forward from past periods.
10 Table 2 shows the results of estimations that follow such a distributive approach. The focus will now shift towards the newly introduced interaction term LC exists x Tax Rate. It records the extent to which the existence of a loss carryforward influences the tax elasticity of investment. It may be observed, at first glance, that as in table 1 the single tax rate effect is negative and highly significant for all estimation procedures. The interaction term runs contrary to the tax rate effect. The coefficient of LC exists x Tax Rate is consistently positive and significant. The tax rate maintains its overall negative effect on firms with loss carryforwards. This effect, however, is significantly lower with such subsidiaries. About half of the negative tax rate effect is compensated in the presence of a loss carryforward. In column (1), the pure tax rate effect is -0.637 and the interaction term is 0.310. The sum of the effect hereby comes to merely -0.327. A by one percentage point increased tax rate will only lead to a 0.327% reduction of the parent corporation's investment into a subsidiary. The results in columns (2), (3) and (4) and those in column
(1) are qualitatively roughly equivalent. 10 The effect of losses in the context of taxation has long been researched on a theoretical and an analytical level. See Altshuler und Auerbach (1990 ), Niemann (2004 . In recent times the topic has found its way into the empirical literature. See Edgerton (2010) as well as Dreßler und Overesch (2010) . 11 Since losses in the foreign subsidiary are isolated with regards to tax, those losses may generally not be accounted for by partners, nor with those partners in or outside the country. See Herzig (2005) .
It is plausible for the existing loss carryforward to compensate the tax rate effect to a partial extent only. Firstly, the subsidiaries' loss carryforwards will eventually be used up.
Secondly, some countries enforce a minimum taxation regulation. Hereby only partial netting out is possible. Thirdly, loss carryforwards may expire due to temporal restrictions or any kind of restructuring. In columns (5) and (6) the BaWü dummy and its interaction with the tax rate is added. As seen in the first regression table, the manner in which BadenWürttemberg parent corporations invest in their subsidiaries does not systematically differ to that of the parent corporations in other federal states. The effort regarding the tax rate effect or the compensating impact of existing loss carryforwards are as a result also applicable to Baden-Württemberg firms. Very high detected volumes of unused loss carryforwards of German and foreign corporations suggest that this aspect is by no means an exotic or peripheral topic.
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The first two regression tables show the effect of corporate taxation on the level of investment, which is measured in fixed assets. Multinational corporations have the opportunity to decide on the amount of fixed assets as well as to structure their investments into different special forms. The amount invested is hereby of less importance. It is much more the way in which these investments are embedded in the corporation's network that is relevant. The third section of this empirical part focuses on such analyses of corporations'
structures. An obvious example of such structures will be picked out and examined.
The assets considered above are primarily found in producing subsidiaries. The production site choice may be subject to various non-tax related arguments. Despite the fact that the implemented control variables largely control for the influence of such aspects, it would be interesting to analyze those firms that are chiefly driven by tax factors, as opposed to any other kind of influencing factors. Holding companies can be viewed as such a form of subsidiary. When establishing such a holding company, a corporation will be swayed especially by tax related arguments. In comparison, tax related arguments will carry much less weight in an argument over where to actually produce. In locations that are favorable from a tax point of view, the number of holding companies in proportion to all observed subsidiaries should be high. (1) A detailed analysis would answer such a question with a counter variable model. 14 Here, the basic linear estimation should be sufficient to show that the effect exists. The estimations of regression table 3 are thus based on the standard method OLS. 15 Dynamic estimations with a past parameter and instrumentation are not appropriate here, as it is not a growing set (like with the investment) that is being examined. It is for the same reason, that the estimations here are not (like in the first two tables) in first differences.
The dependent variable in table 3 is a dummy which is one if the observed subsidiary is a holding company. It is zero if the subsidiary is a production company or a service company without a holding function. As can be seen from regression table 3, the tax rate effect is negative and highly significant for all specifications. This means that in locations with a low tax rate the fraction of holding companies in relation to the number of subsidiaries is relatively high. The results confirm the hypothesis that when looking for a location for a holding company, low tax rates are particularly important. The coefficient of -0.031 in column (2) indicates that a corporate tax rate cut of one percentage point causes the share of holdings with all subsidiaries to increase by 0.031%. Across all estimations, a 10 percentage point tax rate drop brings about an increase in the share of holdings of about 0.5%. Despite being numerically small, this effect is nevertheless statistically significant.
One must not forget that a corporate holding company can easily assemble dozens of production subsidiaries. This means that already one or a few holdings suffice for a group to set up a tax efficient structure.
The corporate tax rate will play a big role in any holding company location decision.
Additionally, further taxes might play an essential role, once profits are repatriated home to the German parent corporation. This so called withholding tax is thus added in columns (5) to (8). Columns (5) and (6) show that a low withholding tax attracts holdings. This effect is considerably stronger than that of the corporate tax rate. A one percent increase in holdings (relative to all recorded subsidiaries in that country and year) is caused by a reduction in the withholding tax by 10 percentage points. In columns (7) and (8) This observation falls in line with the above analysis.
Foreign corporations' investment in Germany
Section 2.1 looked at the tax rate effect on investments of German parent corporations in their foreign subsidiaries. This section will focus on the reverse. It will illuminate where and how foreign corporations are invested in Germany. Generally speaking, the effects taken from the earlier estimation results should also show up for investment into Germany -so called inbound investments. The descriptive structure is the mirror image of that of part 2.1. The estimations, however, will show that there is much less potential for identification with the inbound part. The reasons for this will be explained in that respective section. The econometric section of this part is less about gaining thematic results than demonstrating why empirical analyses under certain conditions may not be conclusive. numbers have doubled in size for the whole of Germany. Baden-Württemberg has seen an increase by a factor of 2.27, from 4.1bn euros to 9.3bn euros.
The increased aggregated level of investment can be traced back to the enlarged average size and number of foreign companies' subsidiaries in Germany. In 1996 there where 3,927 such subsidiaries in Germany. By 2008 that number had risen to 4,619. The average size of a subsidiary was 9.1bn euros in 1996 and 14.4bn euros by 2008. The number of subsidiaries has risen by only 17.7% compared to the 58% that they have increased in average size. The aggregated growth is therefore mainly caused by the latter effect. 
Comparing investment in the different
Corporate Tax development
The German corporate tax rate has been lowered in several steps throughout the thirteen year observation period. The tax-induced attractiveness of investing in Germany is identical for all foreign corporations. Chart 7 shows the corporate tax rate development: A reduction from 57.25% in 1996 to 30.95% in 2008. Solidarity surcharge as well as a uniform trade tax multiplier of 410% has been taken into account here. There is no differentiation according to trade tax, because putting federal city states and larger ones on the same level regarding average trade tax would result in misleading impressions.
Chart 7: Inbound fixed assets in bn. euros Chart 7 demonstrates that investment, as measured by assets held in Germany, has risen whilst the combined corporate tax rate has fallen. A tax rate effect on investment may not reliably be derived from this. If the tax rate in other countries has fallen by more than that in Germany, investors may have looked elsewhere out of tax concern. Investment may also have risen for completely tax-unrelated reasons. Analogous to the outbound observations aspects like GDP, firm profitability and inflation would have to be considered.
As mentioned above, all foreign corporations see the German tax rate development in the same way. This is why the diagrams in chart 8 all have an identical tax rate development. 
Empirical investigation into the effect of tax on investment
The tax rate effect based on outbound investment has been proven in several estimations in section 2.1. This effect should also generally apply for inbound investment. Upon further deliberation it becomes clear, that a possibly existent tax rate effect on inbound investment cannot be proven via the estimation procedures outlined above. Becker, Fuest and Hemmelgarn (2006) have attempted to prove this effect. They investigated the effect of the 2000 corporate tax reform, by looking at average values before and after the reform. A negative effect of tax on inbound investment is detected. The authors themselves point out that the magnitude of the identified effect is surprisingly large.
In the case of outbound investment, considerable variations are present. This is because during the same years the respective countries have different tax rates, which they change at different times and to varying extents. For the inbound case, only unitary features of Germany (e.g. the German tax rate) can be drawn upon. As a result, there is not such a large scope for explanation. When trying to evaluate the tax effect on investment, the inbound case lacks an alternative investment opportunity in one or more additional countries. The outbound case and its 51 possible destination countries provide such an investment opportunity. An evaluation of the effect using our model based on international variations is hardly possible for the inbound case, as it lacks comparable measures. An estimation for the inbound case promises little success, as insufficient variation regarding the tax rates and control variables persist. An estimation for the inbound part is for these reasons deliberately not presented here.
Summary and outlook
The paper shows empirically that corporate taxes have a negative effect on investment. It The inbound case looks at foreign parent corporations` investment into their subsidiaries in Germany. It shows why an analysis based on estimations would not deliver meaningful results in this subset. The reason for this is the lack of variation of the relevant variables necessary for such an approach. The detailed descriptive analysis already leads to the conclusion that cross border investment into Germany has increased throughout the observed time period. 16 A clear conclusion about whether this is because of the fallen corporate tax rate or other factors may not be drawn. 16 Especially the 2008 corporate tax rate reform and its reduction of the corporate tax rate from 25% to 15% could have attracted investors. There are, however, critics who claim that this effect of the reform has only a small reductive effect on the tax burden. See Radulescu und Stimmelmayr (2008) .
